Metro Tunnel Project: Phase 3 – Systems Integration, Testing and Commissioning

Tabled: 20 June 2024

Audit snapshot

What we examined

We examined if the Metro Tunnel Project’s systems integration, testing and commissioning activities are proceeding as planned.

We assessed the Department of Transport and Planning (the department), Rail Projects Victoria (RPV) as part of the Victorian Infrastructure Delivery Authority, VicTrack, Metro Trains Melbourne, Cross Yarra Partnership, the independent reviewer from AECOM Australia and a list of contractors working on the project detailed in Appendix C. 

Why this is important

The Metro Tunnel is a large and complex transport infrastructure project. It aims to increase the metropolitan rail network's capacity to run more trains and make services more reliable.

This audit is an opportunity to assess if the project is progressing as planned during its most complex phase, which involves integrating different systems, such as signalling systems, testing trains in the tunnel and commissioning new assets, such as train tracks.

What we concluded

The department and RPV closely monitor the project. Despite this, the project is delayed.

It is meeting its design and safety requirements, but will not meet the contracted September 2024 completion date.

RPV's revised internal project schedule shows a new completion date in June 2025, which accords with the government's public commitments to open by the end of 2025.

The state will need to pay more to address remaining issues and finish the project. The project has insufficient contingency funds to cover these costs.

The government can apply lessons it has learnt from the Metro Tunnel to deliver other major projects. 

What we recommended

We made 3 recommendations to the department and RPV, including:

  • updating the project's revised completion date and reviewing how much more funding they need to address the remaining risks
  • applying lessons learnt from the Metro Tunnel to other projects
  • addressing the remaining impacts of electromagnetic interference.

→ Full recommendations

Video presentation

Video transcript

Key facts and findings

The key facts and findings graphic says the government expects to open the Metro Tunnel by the end of 2025. Tests show that technology for the stations and signalling systems is so far working as intended. The government will need to pay more than the revised budget to finish the project.

Source: VAGO.

Back to top

Our recommendations

We made 3 recommendations to address 2 issues. The relevant agencies have accepted the recommendations in full.

Key issues and corresponding recommendationsAgency responses
Issue: The Metro Tunnel Project will not meet the September 2024 completion date in its contract and the state will need to spend more to finish it
Department of Transport and Planning and the Victorian Infrastructure Delivery Authority1Update the government on the revised project schedule and review the Metro Tunnel Project's overall budget and contingency situation to determine what additional funds may be required to complete it (see Section 2).Accepted 

2

 

Review and apply lessons learnt from the Metro Tunnel Project to other Big Build projects, including but not limited to:

  • planning workforce resources and contingencies
  • governing and assuring projects
  • building technical capability and capacity (see Section 3).

Accepted

 

 
Issue: Delivery agencies still need to mitigate the impact of electromagnetic interference
Department of Transport and Planning and the Victorian Infrastructure Delivery Authority3Work with affected stakeholders to agree on and implement a solution for the remaining equipment affected by electromagnetic interference (see Section 2).Accepted 

Back to top

What we found

This section summarises our key findings. The numbered sections detail our complete findings, including supporting evidence.

When reaching our conclusions, we consulted with the audited entities and considered their views. The entities' full responses are in Appendix A. 

Why we did this audit

The Metro Tunnel is central to the government's plan to upgrade Melbourne's rail infrastructure.

We have previously done 2 performance audits on the project.

The first audit, which tabled in June 2019, examined the project's strategic planning and early works. 

The second, which tabled in June 2022, focused on the main construction works for the tunnel and stations.

Many of the Metro Tunnel's technology systems are linked in terms of access, power and communication. Any installation delays or failed tests in one system could cause cascading delays through other systems, which could delay the Metro Tunnel’s opening date. 

This audit assesses if the various entities delivering the project:

  • have appropriately addressed recommendations from our previous audits
  • have comprehensive governance and assurance processes
  • can show that testing and commissioning is progressing as planned. 

 

Key project dates

In 2017 the state signed contracts to complete the project by 17 September 2024. 

The government then announced that it expects to open the Metro Tunnel by the end of 2025, in consideration of factors such as aligning the project with other network upgrades and service timetable changes.

The project's revised internal schedule shows the works will be completed in June 2025 for the Metro Tunnel to open by the end of the year.

In this audit, we use the 17 September 2024 contractual date as the baseline to assess the project's progress. This is because:

  • this is the contracted date for the state to complete the project on time 
  • any delay beyond this date will have financial implications for either the state or the project's contractors.

 

Our key findings

Our findings fall into 3 key areas:

1The Department of Transport and Planning (the department) and Rail Projects Victoria (RPV) can show that the project is meeting its design and safety requirements.
2The project will not meet its contracted September 2024 completion date.
3The state will need to spend more to finish the project.

 

Key finding 1: The department and RPV can show that the project is meeting its design and safety requirements

Design and safety requirements

The government has set certain design and safety criteria for the Metro Tunnel. 

The department and RPV have set up governance arrangements and review processes to assure themselves and the train operator Metro Trains Melbourne (Metro) that the project is meeting these requirements. 

This means they can confirm the project is safe for contractors to conduct integration and testing activities including running trains in the tunnel.

RPV

In April 2024 the Major Transport Infrastructure Authority, which includes RPV, merged with the Victorian Health Building Authority to become the Victorian Infrastructure Delivery Authority. RPV was renamed to the Metro Tunnel Project Office.

In this report we refer to the agency delivering the Metro Tunnel as RPV.


 

Safety requirements

Metro set the safety criteria for the Metro Tunnel and accepts assets as they are completed. 

For example, package contractors and independent safety assessors send reports to Metro to show that signalling systems meet safety requirements. Metro then gives contractors permission to test trains in the tunnel. 

To date, Metro has been satisfied with the evidence from these reports that the project is meeting its safety requirements.

But Metro told us there have been delays getting some information from contractors. It said contractors need to provide the outstanding information in a timely way so it can accept the ownership transfer of these rail assets on time.

Work packages

The project has 4 key work packages:

  • early works to relocate utility services, tram infrastructure works, construction power and prepare construction sites
  • tunnel and stations works, including the main tunnelling works, building 5 underground stations, fitting out the stations and installing mechanical and electrical systems
  • Rail Infrastructure Alliance-related works, including constructing rail track structures and cut and cover tunnels, reconfiguring and realigning existing tracks and modifying existing rail infrastructure
  • Rail System Alliance-related works, including designing, supplying and installing power and operational control systems, signalling and platform screen doors at the 5 underground stations.

 

Design requirements

The department set the project's high-level design criteria on behalf of the state.

To make sure the project is meeting these criteria, RPV:

  • sets the scope and technical requirements for each work package based on the department's criteria
  • prepares assurance reports to show the department that the project meets the criteria. These reports include evidence from the independent reviewer, assessors and relevant contractors.

The department assesses RPV's assurance reports to confirm the project has met its design requirements. 

RPV provided the department its latest assurance report in March 2023. The report concluded that the project has met its design requirements so far. 

The department completed its review in early 2024. It progressively updates its findings as testing data becomes available. It then sends updates to the project's route to acceptance team to show that the project is meeting its requirements.

The department's next assurance review was due to start in March 2024. However, the project is delayed so the department is working with RPV to revise the review timeline based on the new project schedule.


 

Applying lessons learnt

In delivering the Metro Tunnel RPV has applied lessons learnt from similar projects, such as the London Crossrail and the Sydney Metro Northwest projects.

For example, RPV learnt from London Crossrail that a project's structure needs to change when it moves from the construction phase to the testing phase.

As a result, RPV set up a route to acceptance team to:

  • focus on integrating systems and testing
  • coordinate package contractors.

This has helped the department and RPV foresee and mitigate common risks in major projects.

RPV also learnt from the London Crossrail project that it should expect to repeat approximately half of its testing program due to the tests encountering unknown issues.

Completing Arden station earlier than the other stations is a good example of RPV applying lessons learnt from an international project.

To minimise the risk of project-wide delays, RPV accelerated construction and testing at Arden station. RPV can now use Arden station to test complex station systems and processes before rolling them out to the remaining 4 stations.


 

Key finding 2: The project will not meet its contracted September 2024 completion date

The project's timeline

The department and RPV closely monitor the project, address risks and use acceleration measures to bring forward work packages. But the project is delayed. 

The project will not meet its contracted September 2024 completion date. 

RPV's revised internal project schedule shows a new completion date in June 2025, but notes there is limited contingency for unforeseeable delays.

There are remaining risks, such as electromagnetic interference, that RPV still needs to manage to deliver the project.


 

Contracted completion date

In 2016 the government said in its business case it could deliver the Metro Tunnel by 2026.

Since its Budget Paper No. 4: State Capital Program 2018–19, the government has publicly said it will complete the project by the end of 2025.

RPV's contracts with its delivery partners aim to start running passenger services in the tunnel by 17 September 2024.

Delays to the project’s September 2024 milestone will add more costs, such as labour expenses.


 

Delays

In March 2024 RPV told us it will not meet its September 2024 completion date.

Its revised internal project schedule says the new date for completing the tunnel is June 2025. This is a 9-month delay.

The schedule also notes that the new date allows for limited contingency. Any delays to critical activities will affect the project's final completion date.


 

Reasons for delays

There are 3 key issues delaying the project's current phase:

RPV told us that …Are …
resourcing issues, such as not enough construction workersdelaying Cross Yarra Partnership (CYP) from completing the CBD stations, which is having a cascading effect on the rest of the project.
supply chain hold-ups, such as disruptions caused by COVID-19affecting construction schedules at certain sites.
issues identified during systems testing and integration, such as software errorsrequiring contractors to do more testing before continuing further integration activities.

RPV is discussing solutions to these issues with the contractors.


 

Acceleration measures

CYP is the contractor building the project's tunnel and stations. To reduce delays, RPV has used acceleration measures to incentivise CYP to bring forward selected work packages. For example, by adding workforce resources and increasing shifts.

Some acceleration measures have been effective. For example, early access to Arden station has allowed RPV to complete the station and use it as a ‘super lab’ for testing.

But CYP could not complete all acceleration measures by the target dates. Issues such as waterproofing in one of the stations caused delays.

This meant RPV could not completely reduce the project’s delays.

RPV told us:

  • the acceleration measures helped contractors to identify and address issues earlier
  • but the measures’ scope did not include the construction of the 2 CBD stations, which is the main cause of the delays.

In December 2023 RPV proposed more acceleration measures to reduce further delays. These measures do not require additional funding because they are minor changes to the project’s requirements. 

CYP is implementing these measures.


 

Managing remaining electromagnetic interference

Trains moving through the Metro Tunnel will generate electromagnetic interference, which could adversely affect certain medical and scientific equipment in nearby hospitals and research facilities. For example, MRI machines in the Melbourne Biomedical Precinct.

The project's environmental management framework requires RPV and CYP to work with the affected institutions to mitigate the potential impact of electromagnetic interference.

RPV and CYP implemented measures so contractors could start testing trains in the tunnel in July 2023.

But to fully comply with the environmental management framework, RPV and CYP need to address the remaining risks before completing the project. This involves:

  • testing how effective their solutions have been so far
  • working with the remaining affected hospitals and research facilities to agree on and implement solutions for the remaining impacted equipment.

Any delays to this work will further affect the project's budget and timeline.


 

Key finding 3: The state will need to spend more to finish the project

Additional costs

The state expected RPV to deliver the project on budget, but RPV will not meet its contracted September 2024 completion date.

There is insufficient contingency funding left, which means it will cost the state more to finish the project.

RPV has advised the government of the additional contingency funds it will likely need to complete the project. But as of April 2024 it has not sought more funding to cover the costs.


 

Cost forecast against the approved budget 

When the government announced the project in 2016, its total estimated investment (TEI) was $10.9 billion.

The project's current TEI is $12.8 billion.

The $1.9 billion, or 17 per cent, increase is due to an extra:

  • $1.37 billion for a commercial settlement for the tunnel and stations in 2020
  • $166 million to increase the scope of the high-capacity signalling trial 
  • $388 million to settle with CYP over COVID-19 delays in 2023.

The project’s tunnel and stations works are forecast to cost $430 million more than its budget. 

The government has offset this overrun using savings from the project’s rail infrastructure budget and its decision to not do $236 million of wider network enhancements.

RPV’s February 2024 forecast still shows the project's total cost will be $12.8 billion, which matches the current TEI.

But in March 2024 RPV confirmed the project will not meet its contracted completion date, which will add costs. 

RPV told us it will update its forecast after negotiating additional costs with the contractors based on its revised internal project schedule.


 

Contingency fund

In February 2024 RPV confirmed:

  • there is insufficient contingency funding left in the project's budget
  • the project's current approved TEI ($12.8 billion) does not include any further funding to address risks.

In its December 2023 major project performance report to the state, RPV advised the government of the additional contingency funds it will likely need to complete the project.

RPV's estimate is mainly driven by the additional costs to finish the project because the project will not meet the September 2024 completion date.

As of April 2024 RPV has not sought more funding to cover these costs.


 

Back to top

1. Audit context

The Metro Tunnel is central to the Victorian Government's plans to upgrade Melbourne's rail infrastructure.

The new tunnel crosses the CBD and bypasses the City Loop to create a continuous line from Sunbury in the north-west to Cranbourne and Pakenham in the south-east. 

The project is now in its most complex phase, which involves integrating, testing and commissioning technology systems such as train signals, platform screen doors and CCTV.

The Metro Tunnel Project

Purpose

The Metro Tunnel aims to increase the metropolitan rail network's capacity to run more services by:

  • removing 2 busy lines from the City Loop
  • introducing high-capacity signalling.

The project includes 5 new underground stations at Anzac, Town Hall, State Library, Parkville and Arden. It aims to improve the community's access to key economic, educational, medical and development precincts.

High-capacity signalling

Compared with conventional signalling, which uses track-side posts and lights, high-capacity signalling allows trains to safely travel closer together. Trains running through the Metro Tunnel will be fitted with high capacity signalling technology, which will allow Metro to run more frequent services. 


 

Tunnel route

Figure 1 shows the Metro Tunnel's route.

Twin 9-kilometre tracks run underground from west of Arden to east of Anzac. They were completed on time in May 2021.

Figure 1: The Metro Tunnel's route

Figure 1 is an illustration of the Metro Tunnel's route and the 5 new underground stations – Arden, Parkville, State Library, Town Hall and Anzac. There are 2 tunnel entrances, one before Arden station and one after Anzac station.

Note: The above drawing is not to scale and is for illustrative purposes only.
Source: VAGO, based on information from RPV.


 

Current phase

The project entered its most complex phase on 24 July 2023 when the first train entered the tunnel.

Since March 2024, the project has run 12 test trains between West Footscray and Hawksburn, with up to 18 services per hour through the tunnel. This simulates an ordinary service timetable.

The current phase is complex because multiple contractors need to install and test different technology systems at the same time. This includes systems that require access to the same spaces, power sources and communications infrastructure. So a delay to one system could cause cascading delays across the project.

This phase of the project includes:

  • installing rail systems (including tracks, traction power and overhead equipment) 
  • testing moving trains in the tunnel and stations
  • commissioning and integrating train and station systems, including platform screen doors
  • trialling staff-related operations, such as running a realistic timetable with trained staff and various scenarios.

Platform screen doors

Platform screen doors are gates that separate passengers from trains. They are automated to open and close at the same time as train carriage doors. The Metro Tunnel stations are the first in Victoria to use this technology.


 

Project roles and responsibilities

Key entities

A combination of public and private entities are delivering the Metro Tunnel. 

The department is the client on behalf of the government. And RPV is the government body responsible for delivering the project overall. 

Other key entities are ...Which is responsible for...
CYPconstructing the tunnel and stations. 
Rail Network Allianceconstructing infrastructure outside the tunnel as well as rail and signalling systems at stations and along the line.
the independent reviewerindependently certifying completion of design, testing and construction work.
Metrotesting and operating trains in the tunnel and stations.

Appendix C includes more details on each entity's roles and responsibilities.


 

Project delivery dates 

Likely opening date

In 2017 the state entered contracts with key delivery agencies to complete the project by September 2024.

The government announced in its Budget Paper No. 4: State Capital Program 2018–19 that it expects to open the Metro Tunnel by the end of 2025.

As of April 2024 the project's revised internal schedule shows it will be completed by June 2025.


  

Key milestone dates

RPV's plan to deliver the project includes 10 key target dates. The last date is the first day of passenger services.

It has achieved 5 targets so far. Targets 1 and 2 were completed on time.

Figure 2 shows the status of the project's key target dates.

Figure 2: The project's key target dates

Figure 2 is a list of 10 key target dates. They are: 1) 16 March 2022 – final design assurance case, 2) 06 October 2022 – to commence dynamic tests in tunnels, 3) 24 July 2023 – works complete for dynamic tests, 4) 02 November 2023 – systems integration testing commences, 5) 30 January 2024 – trial operations procedures commence, 6) 5 October 2024 – trial operations, reliability growth trips and driver training commence, 7) 30 November 2024 – blockades complete, 8) 30 March 2025 – last station complete for trial operations, 9) 30 March 2025 – dynamic testing complete, 10) 29 June 2025 – day 1 train operations. RPV has achieved targets 1–5.

Note: The dates for targets 1–5 are actual completion dates. The rest are planned dates. 
Source: VAGO, based on RPV's revised internal project schedule as of 12 April 2024.


 

Our previous reports on the project 

2019 audit: early works

Our 2019 report, Melbourne Metro Tunnel Project – Phase 1: Early Works, looked at aspects of the project’s planning and early works.

We found that unexpected cost increases had put pressure on the project's budget and contingency fund.

We recommended that the Department of Premier and Cabinet, the Department of Treasury and Finance and the then Department of Transport review the remaining risk contingency fund.

We also identified some of the project's impacts on external stakeholders, including the risk of electromagnetic interference. 


 

2022 audit: main works

Our 2022 report, Melbourne Metro Tunnel Phase 2: Main Works, looked at progress on the tunnel and stations against the project's contracted scope, time, cost and quality targets.

We found the project had experienced cost overruns and time delays. We also noted that further cost and time pressures could arise as the project moved into the systems integration, testing and commissioning phase.

In our 2022 report, we noted electromagnetic interference as a major risk. We found that RPV and CYP had plans to mitigate the impact of electromagnetic interference. But they would not know how effective these solutions were until they tested moving trains in the tunnel.

We made 3 recommendations to RPV, the Department of Treasury and Finance and the then Department of Transport about:

  • assessing if the contingency fund was still sufficient
  • addressing known delays to the project's schedule
  • formalising RPV and CYP's proposed solutions to mitigate the impact of electromagnetic interference with the relevant stakeholders.

 

Back to top

2. Project timeline and budget

The project will not meet its contracted completion date of 17 September 2024 and the state will need to spend more than the revised budget to complete it.

It may still be on track to open to take passengers by the end of 2025, which accords with the government's public commitment.

RPV has advised the government of the additional contingency funds it will likely need to address risks related to delays and electromagnetic interference. 

The project will not meet its contracted September 2024 completion date

The project's timeline

RPV has an integrated program to monitor the project and identify and address risks. But the project is delayed.

The project will not meet its contracted September 2024 completion date.

RPV has revised its internal project schedule with a new June 2025 completion date. The schedule notes there is limited contingency for unforeseeable delays.

There are remaining risks, such as electromagnetic interference, that RPV needs to carefully manage to deliver the project.


 

Contracted completion date

In 2016 the government said in its business case it could deliver the Metro Tunnel by 2026.

Since its Budget Paper No. 4: State Capital Program 2018–19, the government has said it will complete the project by the end of 2025.

RPV's contracts with its delivery partners aim to start running passenger services by 17 September 2024.

Delays to the project’s September 2024 date will increase costs, such as labour expenses. But the project is not going to meet this date.

It may still be on track to meet the government's commitment to open to the public by the end of 2025. To achieve this, RPV needs to address any remaining risks that could cause further delays.


 

The integrated program

Before December 2020 the contractor for each package developed its own construction program.

In December 2020 RPV amended its contract with CYP and introduced an integrated construction program for all work packages.

The integrated program outlines the relevant contractors' roles and responsibilities to meet 6 key milestones to complete the project.

In August 2023 RPV revised these milestones to 10 to make the integrated program more detailed (see Figure 2).

December 2020 contract amendments

During the first years of building and tunnelling, RPV and CYP identified commercial and delivery issues. On 23 December 2020, the state signed settlement and amending deeds with CYP to address them.

CYP and the state agreed to share the extra construction costs.

The state agreed to pay up to a further $1.37 billion towards the extra construction costs on the condition that CYP meet its contracted milestones. CYP needs to cover its share plus any additional costs from its own financial resources. Our 2022 audit discusses this in detail.


 

Delays

The independent reviewer assesses CYP's works and certifies if they meet the project's requirements. The reviewer gives a monthly report to RPV and CYP about the results.

The reviewer uses its own site data, CYP's monthly updates to the construction program including progress to date, and other information such as progress trackers provided by CYP and contractors for its review.

As early as September 2019 the reviewer raised concerns that CYP was not completing the works in a timely way. In its recent reports, the reviewer continues to tell RPV that tunnel and stations work packages were getting delayed. It said CYP:

  • did not consistently complete its works on time
  • based its production rate on optimistic assumptions, which had led to unrealistic program scheduling.

In April 2024 the reviewer noted that the revised internal project schedule largely rectified the unrealistic scheduling, which resulted in a 9-month delay to the final completion date.

RPV is monitoring CYP’s progress and is transparent about delays in a dashboard, which it updates monthly for the department. But RPV has not been able to fully address the independent reviewer's concerns about CYP’s delays and their effect on the project.

The project's overall delays are due to 3 key issues:

RPV told us that … Such as …Are …
resourcing issuesinsufficient number of workers to keep up with CYP's planned production ratesdelaying CYP from completing the CBD stations, which is having a cascading effect on the rest of the program.
supply chain hold-upsdisruptions caused by COVID-19 and key construction material stuck at the Port of Melbourneaffecting installation schedules at certain sites.
issues identified during systems testing and integration, such as software errors a faulty supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system affecting the energisation of traction substations requiring contractors to do more testing before rolling it out to all stations.

SCADA systems

SCADA systems are used in rail operations to monitor and control various processes including train speed, track switch positions, signal statuses and traction power.

RPV told us it is discussing solutions to address these issues with its contractors.


  

Revising the internal project schedule

In April 2024 RPV and its delivery partners revised the project's internal schedule to reflect its progress to date.

They significantly changed the completion dates for the 2 CBD stations from 30 June 2024 to 31 March 2025.

The revised internal project schedule says the new date for day 1 train operations:

  • is June 2025, which is a 9-month delay to the September 2024 date
  • allows for limited contingency, which means any delays to critical activities will affect the final completion date.

RPV has taken steps to reduce delays, such as introducing acceleration measures for CYP. 

Some of these steps have been successful. But RPV has not been able to completely reduce the delay to the project's completion date. 


 

Acceleration measures helped RPV identify issues but CYP completed some late

Acceleration measures

RPV introduced acceleration measures to incentivise CYP to bring forward selected work packages. For example, by adding workforce resources and increasing shifts.

These measures aimed to reduce the risk of delaying the day 1 train operations milestone.

There were 4 sets of acceleration measures:

  • a COVID-19-related arrangement
  • early access to Arden station
  • early track and tunnel system installations
  • providing permanent power at Domain station.

 

COVID-19 acceleration measure

Industry-wide and site-specific COVID-19 shutdowns in late 2021 delayed CYP’s construction schedule.

In January 2022 CYP estimated that COVID-19 had caused a 52-day delay.

In February 2022 it gave RPV a new construction schedule with its proposed measures to reduce the delay. The measures included:

  • changing CYP's building methods
  • increasing CYP's workforce resources
  • adding extra shifts
  • improving logistics coordination. 

CYP also gave RPV an estimated cost of the delays that CYP could claim from RPV because of the shutdowns.

Our 2022 audit recommended that RPV 'finalise its analysis of the COVID-19 impact and time delay mitigations and acceleration proposal delivered by CYP in February 2022 and brief the government on any cost or other implications and, if approved, implement it'.

RPV accepted this recommendation and engaged 3 consultants to assess: 

  • the pandemic's impact on CYP’s construction program between September 2021 and January 2022
  • CYP’s potential legal entitlement to extend its construction schedule under the contract
  • CYP’s potential additional construction and financing costs under the extended schedule.

The consultants' reviews show that CYP’s estimated costs represented value for money for the state.

RPV has since settled with CYP on all its COVID-19-related delay claims to 30 June 2022. The settlement has let RPV minimise its costs associated with the pandemic.


 

Other acceleration measures

Besides the COVID-19-related measures, RPV introduced 3 sets of acceleration measures. 

Figure 3 summarises:

  • their purpose
  • the dates in the contract and the accelerated dates
  • the days RPV planned to save between the original delivery date and accelerated completion date
  • the actual number of days it saved
  • payment arrangements.

The acceleration measures helped RPV identify issues, such as:

  • a faulty manufacturing part that the contractors needed to replace
  • a waterproofing issue, which led to disconnecting and removing a switchgear
  • a design compliance issue, which caused confusion about who owned and was responsible for the handling protocol for a rail cable asset. 

CYP completed only some acceleration measures by the target dates. This led to the measures saving less time than RPV originally planned.

As a result, RPV could not completely reduce the project's delays. RPV said this is because the acceleration measures' scope did not include the construction of the 2 CBD stations, which is the main cause of delays.

Figure 3: RPV's acceleration measures for CYP

 Acceleration measures
 Track and tunnel system installation worksPermanent power at Domain stationEarly access to Arden station
PurposeTo resolve potential coordination issues and give contractors more time for critical testing activitiesTo provide a stable supply of electricity to critical equipment to reduce risks during testingTo make Arden station accessible earlier for testing
Original delivery date30 May 202317 July 202330 April 2024
Planned accelerated completion dateTrack installation: 
28 February 2023
Tunnel system installation: 
11 March 2023
Preparation works: 
30 April 2023
Permanent power: 
15 June 2023
1 November 2023
Actual completion dateTrack installation: 
22 April 2023
Tunnel system installation: 
4 May 2023
Preparation works: 
31 August 2023
Permanent power: 
16 September 2023
22 December 2023
Days planned to save (natural days)9132181
Actual days saved (natural days)38−45^130
Base payment 
($ million)
20.06.331.1
Time-based payment* 
($ million)
5.00.83.7

Note: ^The delay took CYP an additional 45 days to complete the work compared to its original delivery date.
*Time-based payment is an incentive payment if CYP delivered the required work by the accelerated completion date.
Source: VAGO, based on information from RPV.


 

Additional acceleration measures

In December 2023 RPV and CYP agreed to introduce more acceleration measures.

These are minor changes to the project’s requirements that will not add any more costs. The measures:

  • streamline review processes for certifying construction works 
  • revise the handover schedule for completed assets so other contractors can integrate some systems faster.

For example, one measure requires CYP to include the independent reviewer in its program review meetings with the state. This allows the reviewer to have better visibility over the works’ progress and any measures that CYP needs to introduce to reduce delays.

Another measure requires CYP to report to RPV and other contractors on the re sequenced activities in the program schedule. This allows CYP to hand over some assets to the Rail Network Alliance earlier.

CYP is currently implementing these measures. 


 

The state will need to spend more to finish the project

The project's budget and contingency fund

The state expected RPV to deliver the project on budget.

But if RPV does not meet its contracted September 2024 completion date to complete the tunnel, the government will need to spend more to finish it.

This is because delays will add more costs, such as labour expenses. And there is insufficient contingency funding left in the budget.

RPV has advised the government of the additional contingency funds it will likely need to complete the project. But as of April 2024, it has not sought more funding to cover the costs.


 

Approved budget

When the government announced the project in 2016, its TEI was $10.9 billion.

The project's current TEI is $12.8 billion.

The $1.9 billion, or 17 per cent, increase is due to the state adding:

  • $1.37 billion for a commercial settlement with CYP for the tunnel and stations in 2020
  • $166 million to increase the scope of the high-capacity signalling trial 
  • $388 million to settle with CYP on the COVID-19 related delays in 2023.

 

Project cost to date and forecast

Our 2019 and 2022 audits examined the project’s overall performance against its budget by project component.

Figure 4 shows RPV's forecast final costs as of February 2024. 

Figure 4: The project's 2022 approved budget compared to RPV's February 2024 forecast by project component ($ million)

Project component2022 approved budget2024 forecast final costForecast variance
Early works652.9634.7–18.3 (–2.8%)
Land acquisitions715.5658.2–57.3 (–8.0%)
Rail Systems Alliance1,594.61,580.3–14.3 (–0.9%)
Rail Infrastructure Alliance1,180.01,003.0–177.0 (–15.0%)
Wider network enhancements189.596.2–93.3 (–49.3%)
Tunnel and stations7,491.67,921.6430.0 (5.7%)
Project management1,001.2931.3–69.8 (–7.0%)
Total12,825.312,825.30

Note: Project management includes the 'program-wide common costs' and 'program management/Office of the Coordinator General' budget components. Rail Systems Alliance includes the ‘system integration and testing’ budget component. 
Some numbers and percentages may not add up due to rounding.
Source: VAGO, based on RPV’s data from February 2024.

Figure 5 shows key changes in the project's overall budget and forecast since 2016.

The tunnel and stations component is forecast to cost $430 million more than its June 2022 budget.

RPV has offset this:

  • with $177 million of savings within the rail infrastructure budget component
  • by moving $236 million of network enhancements to sit under other related projects (which we identified in our 2022 audit).

But RPV's final cost forecast is out of date because it has confirmed the project will not meet the contracted September 2024 completion date.

This means the total cost of the project will be more than $12.8 billion.

In March 2024 RPV told us it is negotiating additional costs with contractors based on its revised internal project schedule. It said it will update its forecast when it has finalised these agreements.

 Figure 5: Changes in the project's overall budget and forecast cost since 2016

Figure 5 is a bar chart. It shows that in the 2016 business case, the project’s total budget was $10,900.1. In the December 2017 original budget it was $11,038.4 million. In the March 2019 revised budget it was $11,020.1 million. In the May 2022 revised budget it was $12,584.4 million. In the June 2022 revised budget it was $12,825.3 million. And in February 2024 the forecast cost was $12,825.3 million. The budgets and forecast are made up of early works, land acquisitions, Rail Systems Alliance, Rail Infrastructure Alliance, wider network enhancements (except the 2016 business case), tunnel and stations, and project management.

Note: Project management includes the 'program-wide common costs' and 'program management/Office of the Coordinator-General' budget components. Rail Systems Alliance includes the ‘system integration and testing’ budget component.
Source: VAGO, based on RPV data.


 

Contingency fund

Our 2022 audit recommended that RPV 'conduct a comprehensive, bottom-up review of the overall project budget and contingency situation to determine what additional funds might be required’.

RPV accepted this recommendation in June 2022. It reviewed the project's overall budget and contingency fund in June 2023.

In March 2024 RPV told us that there is insufficient contingency funding left in the project's budget to manage known risks and issues, such as costs associated with project delays and the impact of electromagnetic interference.

This means RPV will need to seek more funding from the government to cover the additional costs, such as labour expenses, to finish the project.

It has advised the government of the additional contingency funds it will likely need to complete the project. But as of April 2024 it has not sought more funding to cover the costs. 


 

Further work is needed to address the impact of electromagnetic interference

Electromagnetic interference

Trains travelling through the Metro Tunnel will generate electromagnetic interference, which could adversely affect medical and scientific equipment in nearby hospitals and research facilities.

The project's environmental management framework requires RPV and CYP to work with affected institutions to address the potential impact of electromagnetic interference. This work is ongoing.

As shown in Figure 6, the affected institutions are near to the Parkville and State Library stations. They are:

  • Royal Melbourne Hospital
  • Royal Women’s Hospital
  • Peter MacCallum Cancer Centre (Peter Mac)
  • University of Melbourne
  • Peter Doherty Institute
  • RMIT University (RMIT).

Figure 6: Institutions affected by electromagnetic interference

Figure 6 is an illustration of the Metro Tunnel line and its stations. Parkville and State Library are emitting electromagnetic interference. They are near to 6 affected institutions – Royal Melbourne Hospital, Royal Women’s Hospital, Peter Mac, Peter Doherty Institute, University of Melbourne and RMIT.

Note: The above drawing is not to scale and is for illustrative purposes only.
Source: VAGO, based on information from RPV.

RPV, CYP and the affected institutions do not have agreed solutions for several pieces of equipment. And they need further evidence to confirm if their other solutions are effective.


 

Solutions to mitigate electromagnetic interference

Our 2022 audit recommended that RPV 'formalise the implementation of proposed electromagnetic interference mitigations with relevant external parties to allow for installation and commencement of technical solutions before train testing commences in the tunnel in June 2023'. RPV accepted this recommendation.

During the tunnel's construction, integration and testing, RPV has managed electromagnetic interference by coordinating project activities with the affected institutions' treatment requirements.

But when passenger trains start running, RPV will need a more permanent solution.

A major part of RPV's solution involves relocating MRI services at the Royal Women’s Hospital, Royal Melbourne Hospital and Peter Mac.

RPV has relocated the Royal Women’s Hospital's MRI service to a different floor.

The Royal Melbourne Hospital is relocating its MRI services to a new MRI department. The hospital is currently building a lift to give ICU patients access to the department. In the meantime, it is providing MRI services to these patients at Melbourne Private Hospital.

Peter Mac has temporarily moved its MRI services from its Parkville centre to its East Melbourne centre and the Royal Melbourne Hospital's new MRI department.

RPV is working with Peter Mac and the Royal Melbourne Hospital to find permanent solutions.

This includes a trial with Peter Mac to test if magnetic active cancellation systems (MACS) could permanently address the remaining risks to Peter Mac's MRI machines and the Royal Melbourne Hospital's intraoperative MRI machine. Figure 7 explains this in detail.

RPV and RMIT have agreed on solutions for 16 items of sensitive equipment. But they still need to progress the work for RMIT's transmission electron microscopes.

As of February 2024, the cost to address electromagnetic interference issues is $179 million. This includes total committed costs to date and RPV’s current estimate for future works.

Appendix D shows the status of electromagnetic interference mitigations for the affected institutions, including their completion status.

Figure 7: Case study: trialling MACS for MRI machines

MACS have previously been used to protect sensitive medical and scientific equipment from electromagnetic interference, including from Melbourne's trams.

But there are limited examples where MACS have effectively shielded MRI machines from the level of electromagnetic interference expected from trains travelling in the Metro Tunnel.

To assess if MACS can effectively reduce the impact of the tunnel's electromagnetic interference, RPV has provided funding to:

  • install a MACS at Peter Mac's original MRI facility in Parkville
  • engage independent specialists to monitor the equipment during stress testing, where RPV increases the tunnel's power to produce more electromagnetic interference than it expects from passenger services.

The specialists are providing Peter Mac and the Royal Melbourne Hospital with the data from these tests and consulting with the manufacturer of their MRI machines.

To date, Peter Mac and the Royal Melbourne Hospital have not accepted MACS as a permanent solution for their MRI machines. The April 2024 testing also shows inconclusive results on the effectiveness of MACS.

RPV is working with stakeholders to explore more options and has planned further testing for June 2024.

Source: VAGO, based on information from RPV and the relevant stakeholders.


 

Remaining electromagnetic interference risks

There are several remaining electromagnetic interference risks that could affect the project's budget and timeline.

If ... Then RPV may need to …
the agreed solution for RMIT's transmission electron microscopes is not effective or RMIT does not accept it as effectiveprovide funding to relocate the equipment.
RPV's modelling has underestimated the impact of electromagnetic interference so its solutions for the University of Melbourne's and RMIT's equipment are not fully effective look into new solutions, which could cost more and delay the project.
the MACS trial at Peter Mac's original MRI facility does not effectively reduce the tunnel's electromagnetic interferencepermanently relocate Peter Mac's MRI machines to another facility.
RPV needs to do more work to finish relocating MRI machinesspend more than it planned to.

RPV and CYP are monitoring these risks and working with the relevant stakeholders.

But they will need to explore more options if the Royal Melbourne Hospital finds that installing MACS will not effectively shield its intraoperative MRI machine from electromagnetic interference.


 

Funding for remaining electromagnetic interference risks

RPV estimates that the likelihood of the remaining risks happening varies from 10 to 50 per cent. 

It has advised the government on the additional funds it will need to mitigate them.

To avoid requesting this funding through the state's Budget process, RPV has proposed the government transfers this work from the project's scope to the Sunbury Line Upgrade. This is because:

  • electromagnetic interference is a network-wide issue that goes beyond the Metro Tunnel
  • the Sunbury Line upgrade has unspent contingency funding to absorb some unfunded electromagnetic interference costs.

In June 2023 the state approved RPV's proposal.

But regardless of which project the funding comes from, the government will need to spend more money to address these unanticipated electromagnetic interference issues.


 

Back to top

3. Project governance, assurance and lessons learnt

The department and RPV have governance structures to oversee the project, monitor its progress and address risks.

They have also set up assurance processes and can demonstrate that the project is meeting its design and safety requirements.

RPV has applied lessons learnt from other rail projects to reduce some foreseeable risks.

The department and RPV have governance structures to monitor progress and address risks

Governance structures

The project is currently at its most complex phase, which requires RPV to have visibility of the entire project.

The department and RPV have set up a governance framework that helps them:

  • oversee the project's progress 
  • coordinate work packages
  • verify the works meet the government's design and safety requirements
  • intervene to address emerging risks.

The project's contractors can also raise issues to a joint committee that governs the interfacing works. The committee meets weekly and includes representatives from each work package contractor.

The department is accountable for Victoria's transport network. It works collaboratively with RPV and other transport operators to make sure major transport projects, including the Metro Tunnel, meet its requirements. 


 

Monitoring progress and addressing risks

RPV monitors the project's progress and identifies and addresses risks by:

  • providing weekly progress reports to the department, CYP, Rail Network Alliance, Metro and other stakeholders
  • using its weekly reports to outline major risks and proposed solutions
  • tracking the progress of proposed solutions against identified risks 
  • updating a monthly project dashboard that:
    • assesses risks to the project's cost, time, scope and approvals for the department
    • informs RPV’s major project performance reporting, which RPV provides to the department and Cabinet every quarter.

RPV's reporting highlights issues that could affect the project's progress to contractors, stakeholders and the government.


 

The department and RPV can demonstrate that the project is meeting its design and safety requirements

Design and safety requirements

To make sure it is safe to test and open to passengers, the Metro Tunnel must meet design and safety requirements.

The department set the project's high-level requirements, including its objectives and the specifications for its systems.

Based on these requirements, RPV set the scope and technical requirements for each work package.

Metro set the project's safety criteria, including requirements for:

  • testing trains and running services
  • signalling systems
  • station and platform structures
  • emergency protocols.

 

Making sure the project meets requirements

The department and RPV have processes to check the project meets its design and safety requirements.

These processes include design and safety reviews at each key stage of the project. 

The department and RPV get: 

  • the route to acceptance team to review design requirements 
  • Metro to review safety requirements.
The reviewers consider evidence from …To …

the work package contractors

 

identify issues:

  • with individual work packages
  • between multiple work packages.
the independent reviewerget an objective opinion on a package contractor’s evidence and the project’s compliance with the requirements.

These processes mean:

  • the reviewers can conduct balanced and objective reviews
  • the department and RPV can have confidence in their design and safety assurance processes.

 

Meeting safety requirements

Metro requires work package contractors to submit evidence at each key stage of the project.

It uses this evidence to assess if completed works meet its safety requirements.

There are 6 key stages in the works program. Each stage has its own criteria.

Metro will only approve a work package to progress to the next stage when the contractors' evidence satisfies these criteria.

Metro requires the following evidence: 

  • assurance and safety reports from each work package contractor and the route to acceptance team
  • reports from each contractor that summarise the work package's emerging business impact, commercial readiness and residual risks
  • certificates from the independent reviewer and letters of support from other independent assessors.

In March 2024 Metro told us it is satisfied that the built assets are safe to run. This is based on the evidence it has received from contractors to date, which includes testing results.

But Metro told us there have been delays getting some evidence from contractors, including testing results. It said contractors need to provide the outstanding information in a timely way so it can accept ownership transfer of the rail assets on time.

This is consistent with the independent reviewer's reports, which say that contractors need to provide documents on time so it can certify they have completed work packages.


 

Meeting design requirements

To show the project meets it scope and technical requirements, RPV produces an assurance report for the department at each project stage.

RPV uses evidence to support these reports from:

  • assurance reports from work package contractors and the independent reviewer
  • additional reports at the end of each key project stage from the relevant contractors and RPV's route to acceptance team.

In March 2023 RPV gave the department its project assurance report on meeting critical design requirements. The report describes the processes RPV and its contractors have set up to make sure the project is meeting the requirements. It concluded that so far, the project is meeting its design requirements for operations and maintenance.

The department assesses each of RPV's assurance reports to confirm:

  • the project is meeting its scope and technical requirements
  • the completed assets are meeting the government's requirements.

The department completed its review in early 2024. It progressively updates its findings as testing data becomes available. It then sends updates to the project's route to acceptance team to show that the project is meeting its requirements.

The department's next assurance review was due to start in March 2024. However, the project is delayed so the department is working with RPV to align the timing of the review with the revised project schedule.


 

Managing noncompliance

RPV has procedures for monitoring and managing work packages that do not meet the project's requirements.

Work package contractors are responsible for reporting noncompliance to RPV and proposing solutions.

RPV then:

  • monitors noncompliance using a live reporting system
  • reviews the contractor's proposed solutions, which can involve making minor changes to the project's requirements if necessary
  • reports aggregated data on noncompliance to the department on a quarterly basis.

This allows RPV to oversee noncompliance issues across the project to help resolve them and reduce their effect on the project's cost and timeline.


 

RPV has applied lessons learnt from similar projects to address foreseeable risks

Lessons learnt

RPV considered lessons learnt from similar projects to plan the Metro Tunnel project. In particular, it looked at the London Crossrail and the Sydney Metro Northwest projects.

RPV applied these lessons by:

  • using a single delivery program to better coordinate work packages
  • setting up a route to acceptance team to focus on integrating systems early
  • unifying the Rail System Alliance and Rail Infrastructure Alliance to reduce the risk of issues where their work packages overlap.

This has helped RPV reduce some foreseeable risks.

For example, it completed Arden station earlier than the other stations to use it as a 'super lab' for testing. It based this on a lesson learnt from London's Crossrail project. As Figure 8 shows, this helped RPV identify issues and apply lessons to the remaining stations.

Figure 8: Case study: using Arden station as a 'super lab' for early testing

RPV learnt from London's Crossrail project that it should expect to repeat approximately half of its testing program due to the tests encountering unknown issues.

To minimise the risk of project-wide delays, RPV accelerated construction and testing at Arden station.

RPV has used Arden station to test complex systems and processes before rolling them out to the remaining 4 stations.

Testing at Arden station has helped RPV to identify issues early. For example, it has needed to:

  • redesign the security interface between station room doors 
  • recruit more technical experts to run certain tests
  • redevelop fire testing systems, which involved rewriting the software for running lifts and escalators in fire mode.

Using Arden station as a 'super lab' for early testing has allowed RPV to apply its own lessons to deliver the remaining 4 stations.

RPV plans to have a lessons learnt session with the project's delivery partners to consolidate its learnings from Arden station.

 

A photograph of Arden station showing 2 escalators and a flight of stairs with a worker walking up the stairs.

Source: VAGO, based on information from RPV. Image of Arden station from RPV.


 

Back to top

Appendix A: Submissions and comments

Download a PDF copy of Appendix A: Submissions and comments.

 

Download PDF

Download Appendix A: Submissions and comments

Back to top

Appendix B: Abbreviations, acronyms and glossary

Download a PDF copy of Appendix B: Abbreviations, acronyms and glossary.

 

Download PDF

Download Appendix B: Abbreviations, acronyms and glossary

Back to top

Appendix C: Audit scope and method

Download a PDF copy of Appendix C: Audit scope and method.

 

Download PDF

Download Appendix C: Audit scope and method

Back to top

Appendix D: Equipment impacted by electromagnetic interference

Download a PDF copy of Appendix D: Equipment impacted by electromagnetic interference.

 

Download PDF

Download Appendix D: Equipment impacted by electromagnetic interference

Back to top