Appendix A. Submissions and comments
Click the link below to download a PDF copy of Appendix A. Submissions and comments.
3. Proper accounts and records
Conclusion
DTF implemented effective internal controls to support the preparation of a complete and accurate AFR.
The internal control framework of VicTrack was not adequate. The internal control frameworks of the other material entities were generally adequate to support their preparation of complete and accurate financial reports. However, some entities need to strengthen some internal controls to ensure their financial reports remain reliable.
2. Financial performance and position
Conclusion
The financial performance and position of the state deteriorated significantly in 2020–21.
This year the state made an operating loss of $18.3 billion (compared to $9.0 billion in 2019–20) and had net operating cash outflows of $9.3 billion ($375 million net inflows in 2019–20). This was largely a result of increased costs incurred by the GGS responding to the COVID-19 pandemic.
1. Results of audits
Conclusion
Our unmodified opinion provides reasonable assurance that the financial performance and position of the state of Victoria, and within that the general government sector,
as reported in the 2020–21 AFR, is reliable.
The separate financial statements of 24 of the 26 material entities (entities that contribute most to the consolidated financial results in the AFR) are also reliable. We identified material errors in the financial statements of VicTrack, but they were corrected on consolidation into the AFR.
Auditor-General's Report on the Annual Financial Report of the State of Victoria: 2020–21
Body
The purpose of this report is to inform Parliament and citizens of Victoria about our audit of the state’s 2020–21 Annual Financial Report.
Appendix C. Scope of this audit
| Who we audited | What we assessed | What the audit cost |
|---|---|---|
| DELWP, DET, DHHS (DFFH and DH), DJCS, DJPR, DoT, DPC, DTF and HSV | We assessed whether:
|
Appendix B. Acronyms and abbreviations
| Acronyms | |
|---|---|
| CIP | critical incident procurement |
| DELWP | Department of Environment, Land, Water and Planning |
| DET | Department of Education and Training |
| DFFH | Department of Families, Fairness and Housing |
Appendix A. Submissions and comments
Click the link below to download a PDF copy of Appendix A. Submissions and comments.
4. Monitoring spending related to COVID-19
Conclusion
Although DTF collects COVID-19 spend data from departments, it is not actively monitoring this. Without central oversight, it is difficult to understand how well the state is managing its overall COVID-19 spend.
3. Managing COVID-19 grants programs
Conclusion
Due to the speed with which they set up their COVID-19 grants programs, DJPR and DHHS did not implement effective fraud controls at the start. Although they made improvements over time, there is a risk that internal reviews have not uncovered all cases of suspected fraud. In contrast, DoT and DPC minimised the risk of fraud and waste by building controls into the grant application process and monitoring how grants were used. However, most departments could improve how they consider conflicts of interest in grants management.