Conclusion

The Foundation has developed a range of programs and pilot initiatives that aim to prevent gambling harm. However, the Foundation does not know if it is preventing gambling harm, as its program evaluations focus on outputs rather than on outcomes and impacts. This makes it difficult for the Foundation to understand what makes a program effective and to identify which pilot initiatives to scale up.

In addition, the Foundation does not have an overarching prevention strategy to guide its work and measure its impact.   

Conclusion

The Foundation has developed an extensive research base to support its work. Through its research it has identified the groups most at risk of experiencing gambling harm and understands how gambling can co-occur with other health problems.

However, the Foundation does not always apply research findings in its service design. This means it is not realising the benefits of its research investment and is missing opportunities to improve its services and programs to best meet the needs of at-risk groups. 

Gambling is common and socially accepted in Victoria; around 70 per cent of Victorian adults gamble. It is also the fifth highest source of state taxation revenue, worth over $1.7 billion in 2019–20.

However, gambling harm costs Victorians around $7 billion a year. The highest costs are associated with family and relationship problems, followed by emotional and psychological issues, and then financial losses.

To address harm from gambling, the Foundation began operations in 2012 under the Victorian Responsible Gambling Foundation Act 2011.

FIGURE C1: Audit opinions issued for material entities

We have consulted with named agencies, and we considered their views when reaching our audit conclusions. As required by the Audit Act 1994, we gave a draft copy of this report, or relevant extracts, to those agencies and asked for their submissions and comments. We also provided a copy of the report to DPC.

Responsibility for the accuracy, fairness and balance of those comments rests solely with the agency head. 

Conclusion

Overall, DTF implemented effective internal controls to support the preparation of a complete and accurate AFR.

Except for VicTrack and DJCS, the internal control frameworks at the other 24 material entities were adequate to support their preparation of complete and accurate financial reports. However, some entities need to strengthen some important internal controls, particularly information system security controls.

Summary

The financial performance of both the state and the GGS deteriorated significantly compared to last year as the state responded to the COVID-19 pandemic.

In 2019–20, the state generated revenue of $77.3 billion ($78.6 billion in 2018–19) and outlaid $86.3 billion ($80.4 billion in 2018–19). This reflects a net loss from transactions of $9.0 billion ($1.8 billion in 2018–19).

Conclusion

The Treasurer of Victoria tabled the AFR in Parliament on 15 October 2020.

We provided a clear audit opinion on the AFR again this year.

Except for VicTrack, we provided clear opinions on the other 25 material entities, whose results are consolidated in the AFR. Our qualification on VicTrack did not flow through to the AFR because the State of Victoria adjusted its results on consolidation.

The AFR contains the audited financial statements of the State of Victoria and the GGS.

Our report, which is required by section 57 of the Audit Act 1994, contains matters we judge as significant that arise from the audit and pertain to either the effective and efficient management of public resources or the keeping of proper accounts and records.